In his speech of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 29, 1940 , V.M. Molotov said:
The Soviet Union , having smashed the Finnish army, and having had every opportunity of occupying the whole of Finland , did not do so and did not demand any indemnities for its war expenditure as any other Power would have done, but confined its demands to a minimum. . . .We pursued no other object in the Peace Treaty than that of safeguarding the security of Leningrad , Murmansk , and the Murmansk railway.
It should be noted that, although by their whole policy toward the USSR the Finnish ruling circles played the game of Hitler Germany, the Anglo-French bosses of the League of Nations immediately took the side of the Finnish Government, declared through the League that the USSR was the "aggressor," and thereby openly approved and supported the war which the Finnish rulers had started against the Soviet Union. At the bidding of its Anglo-French bosses the League of Nations , which had disgraced itself by its connivance at and encouragement of Japanese and German-Italian aggression, obediently passed a resolution against the Soviet Union and demonstratively "expelled" the latter from the League.
But matters did not end there. In the war which the Finnish reactionaries started against the Soviet Union , Britain and France rendered every assistance to the Finnish militarists. British and French ruling circles kept inciting the Finnish Governments to continue hostilities.
The British and French rulers systematically supplied Finland with arms and made energetic preparations to dispatch to Finland an expeditionary corps of a hundred thousand men.
In the first three months of the war, Britain, according to a statement made by Chamberlain in the House of Commons on March 19, 1940, delivered to Finland 101 aircraft, over 200 artillery pieces, and hundreds of thousands of shells, aerial bombs and anti-tank mines. At the same time Daladier reported to the Chamber of Deputies that France had given Finland175 aircraft, about 500 artillery pieces, over 5,000 machine guns, one million shells and hand grenades and various other munitions.
An exhaustive idea of the plans of the British and French Governments of that time may be obtained from a memorandum handed by the British to the Swedes on March 2, 1940 , which read:
The Allied Governments understand that the military position of Finland is becoming desperate. After carefully considering all the possibilities they have reached the conclusion that the only means by which they can render effective help to Finland is by the dispatch of an Allied force, and they are prepared to send such a force in response to a Finish appeal (1) .
At the same time, as Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons on March 19, "preparations for the expedition were carried on with all rapidity, and at the beginning of March the expedition was ready to leave...two months before Mannerheim had asked for it to arrive."
Chamberlain added that this force numbered 100,000 men.
At the same time the French Government was preparing a first expeditionary corps of 50,000 men, which was to be sent to Finland via Narvik.
The British and French rulers were engaged in these bellicose activities at the time of the "phony war," when Britain and France were absolutely inactive on the front against Hitler Germany.
But military assistance to Finland against the Soviet Union was only part of a broader scheme of the British and French imperialists.
The above-quoted White Paper of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains a document penned by Swedish Foreign Minister Gunther. In this document we read that "the dispatch of this force is part of the general plan of an attack upon the Soviet Union " and that, "beginning March 15, this plan will be put into effect against Baku and still earlier through Finland ” (2) .
Henri de Kerillis, in his book, "DeGaulle Dictateur," wrote the following about that plan:
According to this plan, the main features of which were explained to me by Paul Reynaud (then a member of the French government) in a letter, which is in my possession, the motorized expeditionary corps, after landing in Finland through Norway, would quickly disperse Russia's disorganized hordes and march on Leningrad (3) .
In France this plan was drawn up by DeGaulle and General Weygand who was then in command of the French troops in Syria and who boasted that "with certain reinforcements and 200 airplanes he would seize the Caucasus and enter into Russia as a knife cuts butter."
It is also known that in 1940 the French General Gamelin worked out a plan for military operations to be conducted by the British and French against the USSR, in which special attention was given to bombing Baku and Batumi.
The preparations of the British and French rulers for an attack upon the USSR were in full blast. The General Staffs of Britain and France were diligently drawing up the plans for the attack. These gentry, instead of waging the war against Hitler Germany, wanted to start war against the Soviet Union.
But those plans were not fated to materialize. Finland was defeated by the Soviet troops and forced to surrender, in spite of all the efforts of Britain and France to prevent her capitulation.
On March 12, 1940, the Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty was signed.
Thus the defense of the USSR against Hitler aggression was strengthened also in the north, in the Leningrad area, where the defense line was shifted to a distance of 150 kilometers north of Leningrad up to and including Viborg .
But this did not yet mean that the formation of an "Eastern" front from the Baltic to the Black Sea had been completed. Pacts had been concluded with the Baltic States, but there were as yet no Soviet troops there capable of holding the defenses. Moldavia and Bukovina had formally been re-united with the USSR, but there were no Soviet troops capable of holding the defenses there either. In the middle of June 1940 Soviet troops entered Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania . On June 27, Soviet troops entered Bukovina and Moldavia, the latter of which had been severed by Rumania from the USSR after the October Revolution.
In this way the formation of an "Eastern" front against Hitler aggression from the Baltic to the Black Sea was completed.
The British and French ruling circles, who continued to abuse the USSR and call it an aggressor for creating an "Eastern" front, evidently did not realize that the appearance of an "Eastern" front signified a radical turn in the development of the war - to the disfavor of the Hitler tyranny and to the favor of the victory of democracy.
They did not realize that its was not a question of infringing or not infringing upon the national rights of Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, or Poland, but of preventing the conversion of those countries into disenfranchised colonies of Hitler German by organizing victory over the Nazis.
They did not realize that the point was to build up a barrier against the advance of the German troops in all areas where that was possible, to organize a strong defense and then to launch a counter-offensive, smash Hitler's armies and thereby create they conditions for the free development of those countries.
They did not realize that there was no other way to defeat Hitler aggression.
Was the British Government right when it stationed troops in Egypt during the war, in spite of Egyptian protest and even resistance on the part of certain elements in Egypt ? Unquestionable, it was right. That was a highly important means of barring the way to Hitler aggression towards the Suez Canal , of safeguarding Egypt from attack by Hitler, of organizing victory over him and thus preventing the conversion of Egypt into a colony of Hitler Germany. Only enemies of democracy or people who have lost their senses can assert that the action of the British Government in that case constituted aggression.
Was the United States Government right when it landed its troops at Casablanca , in spite of the protests of the Moroccans and direct military resistance on the part of the Petain Government of France whose authority extended to Morocco? Unquestionably, it was right. That was a highly important means of creating a base of counteraction to German aggression in immediate proximity to Western Europe, of organizing victory over Hitler's troops and thus creating the opportunity for liberating France from Hitler's colonial oppression. Only enemies of democracy or people who have lost their senses can regard these actions of the American troops as aggression.
But then, the same must be said of the actions of the Soviet Government, which had by the summer of 1940 organized an "Eastern" front against Hitler aggression and stationed its troops as far to the West as possible from Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. That was the only means of preventing an unhindered advance of the German troops eastward, of building up strong defenses, and then launching a counter-offensive in order, jointly with the Allies, to smash Hitler's army and thereby prevent the conversion of the peace-loving countries of Europe, among them Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, into colonies of Hitler Germany. Only enemies of democracy or people who had lost their senses could qualify these actions of the Soviet Government as aggression.
But it follows from this that Chamberlain, Daladier and their entourage, who did qualify this policy of the Soviet Government as aggression and engineered the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations , acted as enemies of democracy or as people who had lost their senses.
What would have happened if the USSR had not, before Germany attacked it, created an "Eastern" front far to the West of the old Soviet frontiers, if that front had not been on the line Viborg-Kaunus-Byelostok-Brest-Lyov , but had been the old frontier - Leningrad- Narva -Minsk-Kiev?
That would have enabled Hitler's forces to win a stretch of hundreds of kilometers of territory and would have brought the German front some two to three hundred kilometers nearer to Leningrad-Moscow-Minsk-Kiev. It would have greatly accelerated the German's advance into the interior of the USSR, hastened the fall of Kiev and the Ukraine, led to the capture of Moscow by the Germans and of Leningrad by the combined German and Finnish forces, and would have compelled the USSR to pass to the defensive for a long time, making it possible for the Germans to release some fifty divisions in the East for a landing on the British Isles and for reinforcing the German-Italian front in the Egypt area. Quite likely the British Government would then have had to evacuate to Canada, while Egypt and the Suez Canal would have fallen under Hitler's sway.
Nor is that all. The USSR would have been compelled to transfer a large part of its troops from the Manchurian border to strengthen its defenses on the "Eastern" front, and that would have enabled the Japanese to release some thirty divisions in Manchuria and send them against China, the Philippines and Southeastern Asia in general, and, in the final analysis, against the American armed forces in the Far East.
As a result of all that the war would have dragged out for at least two years more. The second world war would then have ended not in 1945 but in 1947 or somewhat later.
That was how matters stood with regard to the "Eastern" front.
Meanwhile events in the West took their course. In April 1940, the Germans occupied Denmark and Norway. In the middle of May, German troops invaded Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. On May 21, the Germans reached the Channel and cut off the Allies in Flanders. Toward the end of May the British troops evacuated Dunkirk, withdrawing from France to England. In the middle of June, Paris fell. On June 22 France surrendered to Germany .
Thus Hitler trampled on all and every declaration of non-aggression issued jointly with France and Britain.
This signified the complete bankruptcy of the policy of appeasement, the policy of renouncing collective security, the policy of isolating the USSR .
It became clear that, by isolating the USSR , France and Britain had broken up the united front of the freedom-loving countries, weakened themselves and placed themselves in isolation.
On March 1, 1941, the Germans occupied Bulgaria.
On April 5, the USSR signed a pact of non-aggression with Yugoslavia.
On June 22 of that year Germany attacked the USSR. Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Finland joined Germany in the war against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union entered the war of liberation against Hitler Germany.
The attitude toward this event in Europe and America varied in different circles.
The nations enslaved by Hitler breathed a sigh of relief, hoping that Hitler would break his neck between the two fronts, the Western and the "Eastern."
The ruling circles of France were full of malicious glee, as they did not doubt that " Russia would be smashed" in practically no time.
A prominent member of the US Senate, now President of the United States, Mr. Truman, stated the day after Germany 's attack upon the USSR : "If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible"(4) .
A similar statement was made in 1941 in Great Britain by the then Minister of Aircraft Production, Moore- Brabazon, who said that so far as Britain was concerned, the best outcome of the struggle on the Eastern front would be the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the USSR, as a result of which Britain would be enabled to attain a position of dominance.
These statements undoubtedly expressed the position of the reactionary circles in the United States and Great Britain.
However, the overwhelming majority of the British and American people were in favor of the USSR and demanded unity with the Soviet Union for a successful struggle against Hitler Germany.
It may be taken that the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Churchill, reflected these sentiments when he said on June 22, 1941: "The Russian danger is our danger, and the danger of the United States , just as the cause of any Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe..."
This too was the attitude toward the USSR of the Roosevelt administration in the USA . A beginning was thus laid for the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition against Hitler Germany.
The anti-Hitler coalition set itself the aim of smashing the Hitler regime and liberating the nations enslaved by Hitler Germany. Despite differences in the ideologies and economic systems of the Allied states, the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition became a mighty alliance of nations who united their efforts in the liberation struggle against Hitlerism.
Of course there were differences among the Allies on certain questions during the war too. It is well known, for example, how significant were the differences on such major questions as the opening of a second front, the mutual obligations of the Allies, their moral duty towards each other.
The falsifiers of history and calumniators of every description are now seizing on these differences to "prove," contrary to obvious facts, that the USSR was not, and could not be, a loyal and sincere ally in the struggle against Hitlerite aggression. But since the joint struggle provide no material for such an accusation, they turn to the past, to the pre-war period, and assert that during the "negotiations" with Hitler in Berlin in 1940, the representatives of the Soviet Union behaved in a perfidious manner, not as allies should behave.
They assert that during the Berlin "negotiations" perfidious "plans for the partitioning of Europe" the territorial claims of the Soviet Union "southwards from the Soviet Union towards the Indian Ocean," "plans" concerning Turkey, Iran, Bulgaria and other "problems" were discussed and agreed upon. For this purpose the slanderers make use of reports of German ambassadors and other Hitlerite officials, all sorts of memoranda and German drafts of "protocols" and "documents" of a similar nature.
What actually took place in Berlin? It must be said that the so-called " Berlin negotiations" of 1940 actually represented nothing more than a return visit of V.M. Molotov to two visits paid by Ribbentrop to Moscow. The talks which took place chiefly concerned Soviet-German relations. Hitler tried to make them the basis for a broad agreement between the German and Soviet parties. The Soviet side, on the contrary, used them to sound out, to probe the position of the German side without having any intention of concluding an agreement of any kind with the Germans. In the course of these talks Hitler maintained that the Soviet Union ought to acquire an outlet to the Persian Gulf by occupying Western Iran and the British oil fields of Iran . He further said that Germany could help the Soviet Union to settle its claims against Turkey, including the amendment of the Montreux Treaty on the Straits. While he completely ignored the interests of Iran he carefully protected the interests of Turkey , obviously regarding the latter country as his present, or at any rate, future ally. Hitler regarded the Balkan countries and Turkey as a sphere of influence of Germany and Italy.
The Soviet Government drew the following conclusion from these talks. Germany did not value her connections with Iran; Germany was not bound and did not intend to bind herself with Britain, which meant that the Soviet Union might find a reliable ally in Britain against Hitler Germany; the Balkan states had either been already bought over and converted into Germany' satellites (Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary), or had been enslaved, like Czechoslovakia, or were on the way to being enslaved, like Greece; Yugoslavia was the only Balkan country that could be relied on as a future ally of the anti-Hitler camp; Turkey was already either bound by close ties to Hitler Germany or intended to form such ties.
Having drawn these useful conclusions the Soviet government never again resumed the talks on these questions despite Ribbentrop's repeated reminders.
As will be seen, this was a sounding out, a probing by the Soviet Government of the position of the Hitler government, which did not lead, and could not lead to an agreement of any kind.
Is such a sounding of an enemy's position by peace-loving states permissible? Unquestionably, it is. It is not only permissible but at times a direct political necessity. Only such soundings must be undertaken with the knowledge and consent of allies and their results must be communicated to the allies. At that time, however, the Soviet Union had no allies, it was isolated and, unfortunately, had nobody with whom to share the results of its soundings.
It should be noted that a similar, although very dubious, sounding of the position of Hitler Germany was undertaken by representatives of Britain and the United States already during the war, after the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition of Britain , the United States and the USSR. This is evident from documents captured by Soviet troops in Germany.
From these documents it can be seen that in the autumn of 1941 and 1943, in Lisbon and in Switzerland, negotiations were carried on behind the back of the USSR between representatives of the United States and Germany on the subject of concluding peace with Germany.
One of the documents - a supplement to a report by Weizsaecher, the German Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs - reviews the course of the negotiations in Lisbon in September 1941. This document shows that on September 13, a meeting took place between Aitken , son of Lord Beaverbrook, an officer of the British army and later a Member of Parliament, representing Britain, and Gustav von Koever , a Hungarian acting on the authority of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as can be seen from a letter addressed by Krauel , German Consul General in Geneva, to Weizsaecher.
In the course of these negotiations Atken put the question bluntly: "Could not the coming winter and spring be utilized for a confidential discussion of the possibility of peace?"
Other documents tell of the negotiations which took place between representatives of the governments of the USA and Germany in Switzerland in February 1943. In these negotiations the USA was represented by a special delegate of the United States Government , Allen Dulles, (brother of John Foster Dulles), who figured under the pseudonym "Bull" and had "direct instructions and authority from the White House." His German opposite number was Prince M. Hohenloe, an man closely connected with the ruling circles of Hitler Germany , who acted as Hitler's representative under the assumed name of Pauls. The document containing a summary of these negotiations belonged to the German Security Service (SD).
As is evident from this document, the conversation touched on important questions relating to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and Hungary, and, which is especially important, to the conclusion of peace with Germany.
In the course of the conversations A. Dulles (Bull) states that
In future, a situation will never again be permitted to arise where nations like the German would be compelled to resort to desperate experiments and heroism as a result of injustice and want. The German state must continue to exist as a factor of order and rehabilitation. The partition of Germany or the separation of Austria is out of the question.
Concerning Poland, Dulles (Bull) stated: “by extending Poland to the East and preserving Rumania and a strong Hungary the establishment of a cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism and Pan-Slavism must be supported” (5) .
The record of the conversation further stated that:
Mr. Bull more or less agrees to the political and industrial organization of Europe on the basis of large territories, on the assumption that a federated Greater Germany (similar to the USA), with the adjoining Danubian Confederation, will constitute the best guarantee of order and rehabilitation in Central and Eastern Europe (6).
Dulles (Bull) also stated that he fully recognized the claim of German industry to the leading role in Europe.
It must be noted that this sounding was effected by the British and Americans without the knowledge or consent of their ally, the Soviet Union , and that nothing was communicated to the Soviet Government concerning the results of it, even by way of post factum information.
This might warrant the assumption that the Governments of the USA and Great Britain had in this instance made an attempt to inaugurate negotiations with Hitler for a separate peace.
Clearly, such behavior on the part of the Governments of Britain and the United States can only be regarded as an infringement of the most elementary duties and obligations toward their allies.
It therefore follows that when the falsifiers of history accuse the USSR of "insincerity" they are trying to shift the blame where it does not belong.
There can be no doubt that the falsifiers of history and the other calumniators know of these documents. And if they conceal them from the public, if they say nothing about them in their campaign of slander against the USSR, it is because they are mortally afraid of the historical truth.
As regard the differences concerning the opening of a second front, they were a reflection of the different conceptions as to the obligations of allies in respect to each other. Soviet people believe that if an ally is in trouble one should help him out by all available means, that one should not treat an ally as a temporary fellow traveler but as a friend, should rejoice in his successes and in his growing strength. British and American representatives do not agree with this and regard these ethics as naive. They are guided by the notion that a strong ally is dangerous, that the strengthening of an ally is not in their interests, that it is better to have a weak ally than a strong one, and if the ally, nevertheless, grows stronger, then measures should be taken to weaken him.
Everybody knows that in the Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiqués of June 1942, the British and Americans assumed the obligation to open the second front in Europe as early as 1942. This was a solemn promise, a vow, if you will, which should have been fulfilled in time, in order to make things easier for the Soviet forces, who in the first period of the war had borne the entire burden of resistance to German fascism. However, it is also known that this promise was not fulfilled either in 1942 or in 1943, despite the fact that the Soviet Government had declared on several occasions that the Soviet Union could not reconcile itself to the postponement of the second front.
There was nothing fortuitous about the delay in opening the second front. It was a policy, fostered by the aspirations of those reactionary circles in Britain and the USA who were pursuing their own aims in the war against Germany, aims that were entirely alien to a war of liberation from German fascism. Their plans did not call for the utter defeat of German fascism. They were interested in undermining Germany 's power and, mainly, in eliminating Germany as a dangerous rival in the world market, in conformity with their narrow, selfish aims. But it did not come within their intention to liberate Germany and other countries from the rule of the reactionary forces, which are the constant vehicles of imperialist aggression and of fascism, or to carry out fundamental democratic reforms.
At the same time they were calculating that the USSR would be weakened, bled white, that it would be so exhausted in the war that it would lose its importance as a great and mighty power for a long period of time, and that after the war, it would fall into dependence on the USA and Great Britain.
Naturally, this is not an attitude toward an ally which the Soviet Union can regard as normal.
Diametrically opposed to this policy is the Soviet Union 's policy of inter-allied relations. This policy is characterized by unswerving disinterestedness, consistent and honest observance of undertakings, and by readiness at all times to render assistance to an ally. This attitude of a genuine ally toward other countries, its comrades-in-arms in the struggle against the common enemy, was exemplified by the Soviet Union in the last war.
Here is one instance.
It will be remembered that, at the end of December 1944, Hitler's troops launched an offensive on the Western front in the Ardennes, pierced the front and placed the Anglo-American troops in a difficult situation. According to the Allies, the Germans hoped, by striking at Liege , to crush the American First Army, reach Antwerp , cut off the American Ninth, the British Second and Canadian First armies and arrange a second Dunkirk for the Allies, with the idea of putting Britain out of the war.
In connection with this, on January 6, 1945, Winston Churchill addressed to J.V. Stalin the following message:
The battle in the West is very heavy and, at any time, large decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command. You know yourself from your own experience how very anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after temporary loss of the initiative. It is General Eisenhower's great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, as this obviously affects all his and our major decisions. Our envoy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was last night reported weather-bound in Cairo. His journey has been much delayed through no fault of yours. In case he has not reached you yet, I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere, during January, with any other point you may care to mention. I shall not pass this most secret information to anyone except Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only under conditions of the utmost secrecy. I regard the matter as urgent.
On January 7, 1945, J.V. Stalin sent Winston Churchill the following answer:
I received your message of January 6, 1945, on the evening of January 7. Unfortunately, Air Chief Marshal Tedder has not yet reached Moscow. It is very important to make use of our superiority over the Germans in artillery and air force. For this we need clear weather for the air force and an absence of low mists which prevent aimed fire by the artillery. We are preparing an offensive, but at present weather does not favor our offensive. However, in view of the position of our Allies on the Western front, Headquarters of the Supreme Command has decided to complete the preparations at a forced pace and, regardless of the weather, to launch wide-scale offensive operations against the Germans all along the Central Front not later than the second half of January. You need not doubt but that we shall do everything that can possibly be done to render help to the glorious troops of our Allies.
In his reply message to J.V. Stalin on January 9, Winston Churchill wrote: “I am most grateful to you for your thrilling message. I have sent it over to General Eisenhower for his eye only. May all good fortune rest upon your noble venture."
In its desire to expedite aid to the Allied forces in the West, the Supreme Command of the Soviet forces decided to change the date of the offensive against the Germans on the Soviet-German front from January 20 to January 12. On January 12, a big Soviet offensive was launched on a wide front stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. One hundred and fifty Soviet divisions were sent into action, supported by large quantities of artillery and aircraft; they broke through the German front and threw the Germans back hundreds of kilometers.
On January 12, the German troops on the Western front, amongst them the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies, which were poised for another drive, ceased their offensive and in the following five or six days were withdrawn from the front and transferred to the East against the attacking Soviet troops. The German offensive in the West was disrupted.
On January 17, Winston Churchill wrote to J.V. Stalin:
I am most grateful to you for your message and am extremely glad that Air Marshal Tedder made so favorable an impression upon you. On behalf of His Majesty's Government, and from the bottom of my heart, I offer you our thanks and congratulations on the immense assault you have launched upon the Eastern front.
You will now, no doubt, know the plans of General Eisenhower and to what extent they have been delayed by Rundstedt's spoiling attack. I am sure that fighting along our whole front will be continuous. The British 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Montgomery have today begun an attack in the area south of Roermond.
An Order of the Day issued by J.V. Stalin to the Soviet troops in February 1945, said in reference to the Soviet offensive:
In January of this year, the Red Army brought down upon the enemy a blow of unparalleled force along the entire front from the Baltic to the Carpathians. On a stretch of 1,200 kilometers it broke up the powerful defenses which the Germans had been building for a number of years. In the course of the offensive, the Red Army by its swift and skillful actions has hurled the enemy far back to the West.
The first consequence of the successes of our winter offensive was that they thwarted the Germans' winter offensive in the West, which aimed at the seizure of Belgium and Alsace, and enabled the armies of our Allies in their turn to launch an offensive against the Germans and thus link up their offensive operations in the West with the offensive operations of the Red Army in the East.
That is how J.V. Stalin acted.
That is how true allies in common struggle act.
These are the facts.
Of course, falsifiers of history and slanderers have no respect for facts - that is why they are dubbed falsifiers and slanderers. They prefer slander and calumny. But there is no reason to doubt that in the end these gentry will have to acknowledge a universally recognized truth - namely, that slander and calumny perish, but the facts live on.
Soviet Information Bureau
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(1) “Note of the British Legation, dated March 2, 1940 .” (From the White Paper of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) Stockholm , 1947, p.119.
(2) “Gunther's notes, March 2, 1940 .” (From the White Paper of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) Stockholm , 1947, p. 119.
(3) Henri de Kerillis , “De Gaulle Dictateur .” Montreal . Edition Beuchemin , 1945. Pp. 363-364.
(4) “New York Times,” June 24, 1941 .
(5) “The Conversation Pauls – Mr. Bull”; from documents of the German Archives.